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Abstract 
 
Since the start of the 2008 financial crisis, a multitude of scholarly work has been written on 
identifying the factors that contributed towards it. Many excellent texts and articles have 
identified such factors, including weak banking regulation, the deregulation of consumer 
credit laws, high risk banking, the greed of profit driven traders, the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis, securitisation, deregulation of banking laws, access to convenient credit, irresponsible 
lending, predatory lending and weak macroeconomic policies. This article seeks to offer a 
refreshing and alternative interpretation and identifies a new factor that not only contributed 
towards the 2008 financial crisis, but continued to thrive in the perfect economic storm: white 
collar crime. The hypothesis of this article is that white collar crime is an important factor 
that contributed towards the 2008 financial crisis. To demonstrate this point, the article 
concentrates on the impact of the financial crisis and its relationship white collar crime in the 
United States of America 
1
 and the United Kingdom.
2
 This comparison presents a unique 
opportunity to compare and contrast the different approaches towards combating the 
association between the 2008 financial crisis and white collar crime. The article will initially 
demonstrate that the US and the UK have adopted similar legislative and policy reforms 
towards improving the regulation of their heavily criticised financial services sectors.  The 
similarities are illustrated by the embarrassment of legislative reforms enacted in both 
countries.  For example, in the US this includes the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
2008, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 2008, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act 2009 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act 2012. While legislators 
in the UK introduced the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2009, the Financial Services Act 
2010, the Financial Services Act 2012 and the Banking Reform (Financial Services) Act 
2013.  Conversely, the search for the ‘culprits’ or ‘villains’ who caused and contributed the 
                                                          
1
 Hereinafter ‘US’. 
2
 Hereinafter ‘UK’. 
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2008 financial crisis has demonstrated a number of striking differences in both countries. For 
instance, one of the first legislative measures introduced in the US was the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act 2009,
3
 which is of great significance in this article for two 
reasons. Firstly, the legislation was a direct response to white collar crime that contributed 
towards the 2008 financial crisis. Secondly, this legislation redressed the imbalance created 
by President George Bush, who tasked the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
4
 with tackling the 
‘War on Terror’ and maintaining ‘Homeland Security’ at the expense of white collar crime, 
by providing the Department of Justice with additional funding.
5
 This measure can be 
contrasted with that adopted in the UK, where there has been no direct legislative response to 
the white collar crime that is associated with the financial crisis. The Coalition government 
has only created a small number of reactive criminal offences under the Financial Services 
Act 2012 and the Banking Reform (Financial Services) Act 2013 following several instances 
of market manipulation that will be addressed towards the end of this article.  Another 
important contrast between the US and UK relates to the enforcement strategies adopted by 
law enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies. For example, the FBI has handled over 
1,000 criminal prosecutions while the Securities and Exchange Commission has vigorously 
used its civil enforcement powers against the perpetrators of the financial crisis.
6
 
Furthermore, the SEC has also imposed record amounts of financial penalties and banned 
people from working in the financial sector since the start of the financial crisis.
7
  
Importantly, there is a clear division between the roles of the FBI and SEC, a situation that 
doesn’t exist in the UK. In the UK, the pursuit of white collar criminals has been lethargically 
led by the Financial Services Authority,
8
 the Financial Conduct Authority 
9
 and the Serious 
Fraud Office.
10
 There has been some reluctance from these agencies to actively pursue the 
alleged wrongdoers. For example, both the FSA and SFO were rather averse to investigate 
                                                          
3
 See Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force ‘stopgraud.gov’, n/d, available from 
http://www.stopfraud.gov/index.html, accessed February 16 2015. 
4
 Hereinafter ‘FBI’. 
5
 Hereinafter ‘DoJ’. 
6
 Hereinafter ‘SEC’. 
7
 See Security and Exchange Commission ‘SEC Enforcement Actions – addressing the misconduct that led to or 
arose from the financial crisis’, September 14 2014, available from http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-
fc.shtml, accessed January 14 2015 
8
 Hereinafter ‘FSA’. 
9
 Hereinafter ‘FCA’.  It is important to note that prior to the creation of the FCA, this role was performed by the 
Financial Services Authority under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 who pursued a policy of 
‘credible deterrence’.  For a more detailed discussion see Wilson, S. and Wilson. G. ‘The FSA, “credible 
deterrence”, and criminal enforcement - a “haphazard pursuit”?’ (2014) Journal of Financial Crime, 21(1). 4-28. 
10
 Hereinafter ‘SFO’. 
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the alleged manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate in 2010.
11
  At the time of 
writing this article, the SFO has only secured one criminal conviction in relation to the 
manipulation of LIBOR, yet it has charged thirteen other individuals.
12
 Furthermore, not one 
director of a bank has been disqualified under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 
1986 for their conduct during the 2008 financial crisis, despite a strong amount of political 
rhetoric from Vince Cable MP.
13
 However, it is important to note that the FCA and its 
predecessor the FSA, has increased the number of prohibition orders,
14
 which permit the 
regulator to ban individuals from working in the financial services sector and imposed record 
financial penalties on both firms and individuals who have breached its rules and regulations 
since 2008.
15
 A key part of the discussion of the response in the UK will emanate from the 
sparse resources provided for the SFO by the Coalition government since 2010. Once again, 
this is an important contrast between the US and the UK.  There is no individual or ‘super 
villain’ that has become the face of white collar crime during the financial crisis despite the 
illegal activities of notorious white collar criminals including Bernard Madoff and Alan 
Stanford.  The article concludes that the response by the US and UK governments and its law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies towards white collar crime during the financial crisis 
has been lacklustre and they have wrongly prioritised imposing financial penalties at the 
expense of pursuing criminal prosecutions.
16
 
 
The Financial Crisis and the Usual Suspects 
 
A previously unattributed factor that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis is white collar 
crime.
17
  However, it is important to note and accept that white collar crime was not the sole 
                                                          
11
 Hereinafter ‘LIBOR’. 
12
 Serious Fraud Office ‘LIBOR manipulation: banker pleads guilty to conspiracy to defraud’, October 7 2014, 
available from http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2014/libor-manipulation-
banker-pleads-guilty-to-conspiracy-to-defraud.aspx, accessed January 14 2015. 
13
 For a general discussion of this point see Hillman, H. ‘Are the current laws and potential enforcement 
measures effective in achieving the accountability of bank directors for their actions, or the actions of the banks 
they manage? A comparison of UK and US approaches’, in Ryder, N, Turksen, U. and Hassler, S. (eds) Fighting 
Financial Crime in the Global Economic Crisis (Routledge: 2014) at 189-229. 
14
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 56. 
15
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 206.  In 2014, the FCA reported that the amount of times 
imposed totalled £1,471,431,800.  See Financial Conduct Authority ‘2014 Fines’, January 7 2015, available 
from http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/enforcement/fines/2014, accessed February 4 2015. 
16
 For an interesting discussion of why there have been a low number of criminal prosecutions since the 
financial crisis see Pontell, H. Black, W. and Geis, G. ‘Too big to fail, too powerful to jail? On the absence of 
criminal prosecutions after the 2008 financial meltdown’ (2014) Crime, Law and Social Change, 61(1), 1-13. 
17
 For a more detailed explanation of this and other associated terms see Harrison, K. and Ryder, N. The Law 
Relating to Financial Crime in the United Kingdom (Ashgate: Farnham, 2013) at 1-3. 
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and only cause of the financial crisis.  For example, it has been asserted by many leading 
economists,
18
 the International Monetary Fund,
19
 the Department of Treasury,
20
 HM 
Treasury,
21
 official enquiries 
22
 and academic commentators 
23
 that the foundations of the 
financial crisis were laid as a result of the spectacular collapse of the US subprime mortgage 
market.  Others have argued that the foundation of the financial crisis was placed by the 
continued imposition of low interest rates by the Federal Reserve,
24
 which was used by 
successive US governments as a preventative measure to avoid economic turmoil.
25
  
Furthermore, it is also interesting to note that the adoption of low interest rates continued 
following the terrorist attacks in September 2001.
26
  Other well documented factors that 
contributed towards the 2008 financial crisis, which are beyond the scope of the article, 
include the deregulation of banking laws,
27
 the development and promotion by lenders of 
access to convenient credit.
28
  This, when combined with the irresponsible lending practices 
or predatory lending,
29
 by financial institutions contributed towards record levels of personal 
debt and extreme levels over indebtedness.
30
   Another well documented factor that 
contributed towards the financial crisis was ineffective banking regulation.  This is clear 
                                                          
18
 Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. This time is different – eight centuries of financial folly (Princeton University 
Press: New Jersey, 2009). 
19
 See International Monetary Fund Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring 
Financial Soundness (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
20
 Department of Treasury Financial regulatory reform – A new foundation: Rebuilding financial supervision 
and regulation (Department of Treasury: London, 2009). 
21
 For an interesting commentary on the UK response to the financial crisis see Arora, A. Banking Law 
(Pearson: Harlow: 2014) at 123-167 and HM Government Review of HM Treasury’s management response to 
the financial crisis (HM Government: London, 2012). 
22
 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis in the United States (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Washington DC, 2011).   
23
 For an interesting discussion of the subprime model see Seitz, N., Gilsinan, J., Fisher, J., Harshman, E., Islam, 
M., Yeager, F. and Millar, J. ‘The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis: what have we learned?’  (2010) Company 
Lawyer, 31(11), 355–361, McDonald, O. ‘The American mortgage market’ (2012) Company Lawyer, 33(6), 
183–184 and Yeoh, P. ‘Hedge funds: from privileged child to locust and now bogeyman?’ (2012) Company 
Lawyer, 33(2), 42–49.   
24
 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission above, n 22 at xvi. 
25
 See Taylor, J. The financial crisis and the policy responses: an empirical analysis of what went wrong 
National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, 2009) 
26
 See Neely, C. ‘The Federal Reserve Responds to Crises: September 11th Was Not the First’ (2004) Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April, 86(2), 27-42 
27
 The arguments on the relationship between the financial crisis and banking deregulation relate to the impact 
of several pieces of legislation including the Graham-Leach-Bailey Act 1999, the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 1980 and the Garn St Germain Depository Institutions Act 1982.  See 
Levitin, A. ‘The crisis without a face: emerging narratives of the financial crisis’ (2009) University of Miami 
Law Review, 63, 999-1010, at 1004. 
28
 See Ryder, N. and Thomas, R. ‘Convenient credit and consumer protection - A critical review of the 
responses of Labour and coalition governments’ (2011) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 33(1), 85-
95. 
29
 See Ryder, N. and Broomfield, K. ‘Predatory lending and white collar crime: A critical reflection’ (2014) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review (9), 287-293. 
30
 See Dickerson, M. ‘Over-indebtedness, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the effect on US cities’ (2009) 
Fordham Urban Law Journal, 36, 395-425. 
5 | P a g e  
 
illustrated in the UK following the publication of several damning reports 
31
 into the 
regulatory performance of the FSA.
32
  Likewise, the SEC has attracted a fair share of 
criticism due to its sluggish response to the Ponzi fraud scheme of Bernard Madoff.
33
  There 
are many other factors that contributed towards the 2008  crisis including subprime mortgage 
crisis,
34
 weak banking regulation,
35
 high levels of consumer debt,
36
 toxic debts,
37
 
securitisation,
38
 deregulation of banking legislation,
39
 ineffective macroeconomic policies,
40
 
weak credit regulation,
41
 deregulation of consumer credit legislation,
42
 self-regulation credit 
rating agencies 
43
 and the culture of some banking practices.
44
 However, it is the author’s 
contention that white collar crime is an equally important factor and this is considered in the 
next section of the article.   
 
The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime 
 
Initially, the link between the financial crisis and white collar crime was at times difficult to 
quantify and establish.  There is no ‘super villain’ that has become the face of white collar 
crime during the financial crisis.  However, research has concluded that several different 
                                                          
31
 See for example, Financial Services Authority The Turner Review A regulatory response to the global 
banking crisis (Financial Services Authority: London, 2009) and HM Treasury Walker Review of Corporate 
Governance of UK Banking Industry (HM Treasury: London, 2009). 
32
 See HM Treasury Select Committee The Run of the Rock (HM Treasury Select Committee: London, 2008). 
33
 See Ryder, N. The financial crisis and white collar crime – the perfect storm (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 
2014) at 138-142. 
34
 See for example European Commission Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU 
(European Commission: Brussels, 2009). 
35
 Hutchins, A. ‘Flip That Prosecution Strategy: An Argument for Using RICO to Prosecute Large-Scale 
Mortgage Fraud’ (2011) Buffalo Law Review 59(1), 293 at 306 
36
 See generally Dickerson above, n 30. 
37
 Arsalidou, D. ‘The banking crisis: rethinking and refining the accountability of bank directors’ (2010) Journal 
of Business Law, 4, 284-310 at 292. 
38
 For a critical discussion of securitisation see Nwogugu, M. ‘Securitisation is illegal: racketeer influenced and 
corrupt organisations, usury, antitrust and tax issues’ (2008) Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation, 23(6), 316-332. 
39
 See Levitin above, n 27. 
40
 Gevurtz, G. ‘The role of corporate law in preventing a financial crisis: reflections on in re Citigroup Inc 
shareholder derivative litigation’ (2010) Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal, 23, 
113, at 3. 
41
 Choi, J. and Papaioannou, M. ‘Financial crisis and risk management: reassessing the Asian financial crisis in light 
of the American financial crisis’ (2010) East Asia Law Review, Summer, 5, 442–466, at 443 
42
 See for example the impact of the decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha 
Service Corp 439 U.S. at 299.  For a more detailed discussion of the impact of this case on the deregulation of 
the consumer credit market in the US see Schaefer, E. ‘The Credit Card Act of 2009 was not enough: a national 
usury rate would provide consumers with the protection they need’ (2012) University of Baltimore Law Review, 
Summer, 41, 741-767. 
43
 See European Commission above, n 34. 
44
 See generally Tomasic, R. ‘The financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial crime’ (2011) Journal of 
Financial Crime, 18(1), 7–31. 
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types of white collar crime have interacted with the traditional variables, as outlined above, 
that contributed towards the financial crisis.  It is my contention that this includes the 
relationship between subprime mortgages and mortgage fraud, the activities of some Credit 
Rating Agencies in the lead up to the financial crisis,
45
 predatory lending, Ponzi fraud 
schemes, market misconduct and market manipulation.
46
 Some of these examples are now 
considered in more detail.  For example, mortgage fraud was identified as one of the most 
widespread and uncontrolled white collar crimes associated with the financial crisis.
47
  This is 
clearly illustrated by the fact that the FBI has moved mortgage fraud towards the top of its 
white collar crime agenda.
48
  Since the start of the 2008 financial crisis, the FBI has secured 
over 1,200 mortgage fraud related convictions, launched hundreds of mortgage fraud related 
investigations, created a plethora of mortgage fraud task forces and attempted to recompense 
lenders and borrowers who have been victims of this type of white collar crime.
49
  The 
explosion of instances of mortgage fraud associated with the financial crisis was clearly 
illustrated by the dramatic increase in the number of alleged instances of mortgage fraud 
reported to the Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.50  For 
example, between 1996 and 2006 FinCEN received 82,851 mortgage fraud related suspicious 
activity reports.
51
  During this period the number of suspected instances of mortgage fraud 
reported to FinCEN increased by 1,400 per cent.
52
  Furthermore, FinCEN stated that between 
2006 and 2007 it received 37,313 mortgage fraud SARs.
53
  This figure represented a 45 per 
cent of the total mortgage fraud related reports it received between 1996 and 2006.  In 2010 
the number of mortgage fraud related SARs received by FinCEN numbered 70,472,
54
 while 
                                                          
45
 Hereinafter ‘CRA’. 
46
 See Ryder above, n 33. 
47
 Ibid., at 47-58. 
48
 For an interesting discussion of this see Chambers, C. and Ryder, N. ‘The credit crunch and mortgage fraud- 
too little too late? A comparative analysis of the policies adopted in the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom’. In: Balogh, I. and Kis, S., eds. (2010) Housing, housing costs and mortgages: Tends, impact and 
prediction, Nova Science Publishers, 1-22. 
49
 See Federal Bureau of Investigation ‘Financial Crimes Report to the Public – Fiscal Years 2010-2011’, n/d, 
available from http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011/financial-
crimes-report-2010-2011#Mortgage, accessed January 9 2015. 
50
 Hereinafter ‘FinCEN’. 
51
 Hereinafter ‘SARs’. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Mortgage Loan Fraud an Industry Assessment 
based upon Suspicious Activity Report Analysis (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: Washington DC, 
2006) at 4. 
52
 Mahallati, N. ‘Chapter 174: California’s dedicated mortgage fraud statute’ (2010) McGeorge Law Review, 
41, 712-724, at 717.   
53
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Mortgage Loan Fraud an update on trends based on analysis of 
suspicious activity reports April 2008 (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: Washington DC, 2008) at 4. 
54
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Mortgage Loan Fraud Update – suspicious activity report filings 
from January 1 – December 31 2010 (Financial Crime Enforcement Network: Washington DC, 2011) at 2. 
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in 2011, the number increased to 92,028,
55
 an increase of 33 per cent.
56
 This position was 
succinctly summarised by Smith who concluded that “the past decade has witnessed an 
explosion of mortgage fraud, with reports to the federal government of suspected criminal 
behaviour rising by a magnitude of over eighteen times from 2000 to 2008”.57  Furthermore, 
it has been argued that the figures from FinCEN only represent a small percentage of the true 
extent of mortgage fraud.
58
  It is also interesting to note that “mortgage fraud, far from 
abating, has only expanded since the foreclosure crisis began”.59   
 
Another example of white collar crime that contributed toward the financial crisis was 
predatory lending.
60
  The most comprehensive definition of predatory lending was afforded 
by the Department of Treasury’s Task Force on Predatory Lending which provides that it 
“involves engaging in deception or fraud, manipulating the borrower through aggressive 
sales tactics, or taking unfair advantage of a borrower’s lack of understanding about loan 
terms”.61  It has been argued that any loan could be categorised as predatory lending where 
the debtor does not have adequate funds to meet the monthly repayments.
62
 Predatory lending 
can be divided into two categories.  Firstly, the lending activity includes illegal lending 
practices such as fraud.
63
  Secondly, predatory lending behaviour that is not necessarily 
illegal but actions that are “misused by unprincipled lenders”.64  The foundations of predatory 
lending were put in place by legislation that was originally designed to prevent such 
practices, to end to concept of redlining and to increase consumer’s access to credit.65  For 
example, the Fair Housing Act 1968, the Community Reinvestment Act 1977 and the 
                                                          
55
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Mortgage Loan Fraud (Financial Crime Enforcement Network: 
Washington DC, 2012) at 2. 
56
 Lexis Nexis The LexisNexis 14th Annual Mortgage Fraud Report (Lexis Nexis: 2012) at 3. 
57
 Smith, J. ‘The structural causes of mortgage fraud’ (2010) Syracuse Law Review, 60, 473-500, at 473. 
58
 For example, Black took the view that “the total SARs figure is only a faint indication of the true incidence of 
mortgage fraud”.  See Black, K. ‘Neo-classical economic theories, methodology, and praxis optimize 
criminogenic environments and produce recurrent intensifying crisis’ (2011) Creighton Law Review, 44, 597–
644, at 623. 
59
 Fisher, L. ‘Target marketing of subprime loans: racialised consumer fraud and reverse redlining’ (2009) 
Journal of Law & Policy, 18, 121-155, at 144. 
60
 Shelley, M. and Jackson, M. ‘Sub-prime Lending, its Deficiencies and the Government Responses’ (2008) 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 23(10), 523-537, at 527.   
61
 Department of Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending 1 
Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending: Washington DC, 2000) at 1. 
62
 Nwogugu, M. ‘Corporate governance and high-risk finance: alternative methods for financing 
domestic/foreign emerging growth companies with inadequate collateral’ (2005) Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation, 20(10), 541-558, at 544. 
63
 McNonagle, D. ‘In pursuit of safety and soundness: an analysis of the OCC’s anti-predatory lending standard’ 
(2004) Fordham Urban Law Journal, 31, November, 1533-1554, at 1538. 
64
 Ibid.  
65
 Redlining can be defined as “refusing people access to credit based on where they live”.  See Ryder and 
Broomfield above, n 29 at 291 
8 | P a g e  
 
Financial Services Modernization Act 1999 contributed to “the seeds of predatory lending 
and pursuit of unacceptable risk to blossom into the carnivorous plants of financial 
meltdown”.66  Legislation that has attempted to limit the impact of predatory lending included 
the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914, the Truth in Lending Act 1968, the Home 
Ownership Equity Protection Act 1994, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 1974, the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 1974, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 1977, the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act 1994, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory 
Lending Act 2007 and the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act 
2009.  The predatory lending laws are enforced by the Federal Trade Commission,
67
 by virtue 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914.  This Act prohibits unjust and misleading 
practices,
68
 and provides the FTC with the ability and flexibility to determine what amounts 
to unjust, misleading and predatory practices. Therefore, the FTC who is charged with 
enforcing the Federal Trade Commission Act has been provided with an extensive array of 
enforcement powers.
69
  Since the start of the financial crisis the FTC has imposed large 
financial penalties on firms who have participated in predatory lending practices.  This 
includes for example Household International who agreed to pay a $484m fine to the FTC 
70
 
and Ameriquest paying $325m for conducting predatory lending practices.
71
  Additionally, in 
September 2008 the FTC reached an agreement with Bear Stearns and EMC Mortgage for 
$28m after they admitted engaging in “unlawful practices in servicing consumers’ home 
mortgage loans”.72  Additionally, the DoJ reached a financial settlement with Bank of 
America for $335m over discriminatory lending practices 
73
 and $175m with Wells Fargo.
74
   
                                                          
66
 Seitz, N., Gilsinan, J., Fisher, J., Harshman, E., Islam, M., Yeager, F. and Millar, J. ‘Bank integrity: the case of 
subprime lending’ (2009) Company Lawyer, 30(9), 271–276, at 274. 
67
 Hereinafter ‘FTC’. 
68
 15 U.S.C 45(a)(1) 2006. 
69
 The FTC has an extensive array of enforcement powers from over 70 laws and they are able to seek financial 
redress for consumers, conduct investigations and impose financial penalties.  See Federal Trade Commission 
‘Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission’, n/d, available from http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes, 
accessed February 4 2015.   
70
 Santanu, R. and Chakrabarti, B.  ‘Operational risk and the banking sector’ (2005) Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation, 20(10), 535-540, at 536. 
71
 Connecticut Department of Banking ‘Ameriquest to Pay $325 Million for Predatory  
Lending Practices that Bilked Consumers’, January 23 2006, available from 
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2245&q=309018, accessed October 21 2013. 
72
 Federal Trade Commission ‘Bear Stearns and EMC Mortgage to Pay $28 Million to Settle FTC Charges of 
Unlawful Mortgage Servicing and Debt Collection Practices’, September 9 2008, available from 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/emc.shtm, accessed October 21 2013. 
73
 Isidore, C. ‘BofA settles unfair lending claims for $335 million’, December 21 2011, available from 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/21/news/companies/bank_america_settlement/, accessed October 21 2013. 
74
 Department of Justice ‘Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Resulting in More Than 
$175 Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair Lending Claims’, July 12 2012, available from 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-dag-869.html, accessed October 21 2013.  For an excellent 
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Furthermore, there is also evidence to suggest that the 2008 financial crisis resulted in a 
significant increase in the exposure and instances of Ponzi related frauds. The SEC defined a 
Ponzi fraud as “an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing 
investors from funds contributed by new investors”.75  It has been suggested that between 
2007 and 2009 over 150 Ponzi fraud schemes were identified with losses exceeding 
$16.5bn.
76
  Furthermore, the relationship between the financial crisis and Ponzi related fraud 
schemes is clearly illustrated by referring to the number of enforcement actions pursued by 
the SEC against the perpetrators of this white collar crime.  For example, according to 
Johnston et al there has been a 21 per cent increase in the number of Ponzi fraud related 
enforcement actions conducted by the SEC.
77
  The FBI added “the recent financial crisis led 
to the identification of numerous investment fraud schemes, many of which were Ponzi 
schemes and have increased the number of agents investigating such schemes by 61 per 
cent”.78  However, it is very important to note that “the recession serves as the impetus to 
provide a transparency that brings to light Ponzi schemes and existing frauds”.79  The next 
section of the article appraises the responses of authorities in the US and UK towards white 
collar crime emanating from the financial crisis.   
 
Responses in the United States of America 
  
The first legislative measure that was introduced to counter the threat and problems caused by 
the financial crisis was the Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act in 2008.
80
  This legislation 
was designed to permit the US government to pursue bad or troubled assets and to protect the 
financial system, tax payers and prevent further economic disturbances.  The most important 
part of this Act was the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Programme,
81
 which resulsted 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussion of the enforcement of predatory lending laws see Bostic, R. W., with Engel, K., McCoy, P., A. 
Pennington-Cross, & Wachter, S. ‘State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal 
Enforcement Mechanisms (2008) Journal of Economics and Business, 60(1-2), 47-66. 
75
 Securities and Exchange Commission ‘SEC enforcement actions against Ponzi schemes’, n/d, available from 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-ponzi.shtml, accessed February 4 2014. 
76
 Anderson, C. ‘Ponzi Schemes’ Collapses Nearly Quadrupled in '09’, December 29 2009, available from 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202437299784, accessed October 20 2013. 
77
 Johnston, K., Johnson, K. and Hummel, J. ‘Ponzi schemes litigation risks: what every financial services 
company should know’ (2010) North Carolina Banking Institute, 14, 29-57, at 29. 
78
 Federal Bureau of Investigation above, n 49. 
79
 Podgor, E. ‘White collar crime and the recession: was the chicken or egg first?’ (2010) University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 205–222, at 218. 
80
 Pub.L. 110–343. 
81
 Hereinafter ‘TARP’. 
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in the US government providing $700bn of financial support.  The Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act 2008 aimed to improve the regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, after 
they were heavily exposed to record financial losses in the subprime mortgage sector.
82
  This 
was followed by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009, which aimed to reduce 
the financial benefits of those firms who had utilised and received TARP funding.  The final 
piece of legislation introduced in the US was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 2010, 
the aim of which was to promote and manintain financial stability and improve the US 
system of banking regulation.
83
  However, for the purpose of this article the most important 
legislation was the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 2009.
84
  Importatntly, the 
enactment of this legislation was a direct response to “chronic misconduct which may have 
helped foster economic instability”.85 Specifically, the Act provided additional funding for 
the FBI and DoJ, it increased the custodial sentences for those convicted of mortgae fraud, it 
amended fraud and money laundering legislation and it increased the regulation of TARP.   
 
The US has presented an aggressive legislative, policy and enforcement stance towards white 
collar crime emanating from the financial crisis.  President Barak Obama boldly declared on 
several occasions that his administration would take an aggressive stance against the 
perpetrators of the financial crisis.  For example, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 
2009, provided essential funding for law enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies.  These 
measures provided a welcome addition to the already extensive legislative armoury of the 
DoJ, SEC and the FBI.  These measures are a stark contrast to the ill-advised white collar 
crime policies adopted by President George Bush following the terrorist attacks in September 
2001.
86
  As a result of Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 2009, President Barak Obama 
created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force via a Presidential Executive Order 
13,519.
87
  The aim of the Task Force was to tackle white collar crime that originated during 
                                                          
82
 See McClendon, J. ‘The perfect storm: how mortgaged-backed securities, federal deregulation, and corporate 
greed provide a wake-up call for reforming executive compensation’ (2009) University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of Business Law, Fall, 12, 131-179. 
83
 Krawiec, K. ‘Don’t screw joe the plumber: the sausage-making of financial reform’ (2013) Arizona Law 
Review, Spring, 55, 53-103, at 54. 
84
 Pub.L. 111–21, S. 386, 123 Stat. 1617. 
85
 Reidy, J. ‘The problem of proceeds in the era of FERA’ (2010) American Journal of Criminal Law, Summer, 
5, 295-323, at 318.  The other legislation introduced was the Housing and Economic Recovery Ac, the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 
86
 See Ryder above, n 33 at 89-95. 
87
 White House ‘Executive Order 13519 - Establishment of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’, 
November 17 2009, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-financial-fraud-
enforcement-task-force, accessed January 21 2015. 
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the financial crisis.
88
  However, the performance of this Task Force is unfavourably 
compared to the performance of its predecessor, the Corporate Fraud Task Force.
89
 The aim 
of the Corporate Fraud Task Force was to “provide direction for the investigation and 
prosecution of cases of securities fraud, accounting fraud, mail and wire fraud, money 
laundering … and other related financial crimes committed by commercial entities”.90  
Arogeti argued that the Corporate Fraud Task Force was created to ‘restore market 
confidence and cut down on corporate fraud’.91 The Corporate Fraud Task Force secured over 
1,200 prosecutions which included numerous company chief executive officers, chief 
executives and chief financial officers.
92
  Therefore, the merits of creating another task force 
and replacing an already existing and successful one must also be questioned.  A very 
important question that must be considered is why haven’t any high profile contributors to a 
financial crisis been successfully prosecuted in the US?  The ability of federal prosecutorial 
agencies to prosecute chief executives officers or chief financial officers of those 
corporations who were involved in risky, unethical, immoral or illegal business practices that 
contributed to the financial crisis has been limited by several factors.  This includes for 
instance the myriad and complex nature of the financial markets and thousands of 
transactions that such firms are involved in.  Thus, the collection of evidence is problematic 
and extremely difficult.  Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that a concerted and 
aggressive effort to those involved in the financial crisis could have resulted in prosecutions 
and convictions.  For example, as a result of the 1980s Savings and Loans Crisis federal 
prosecutors successfully instigated criminal proceedings against approximately 800 senior 
banking officials.
93
  It is also interesting to compare the contrasting policies of the DoJ after 
                                                          
88
 For a more detailed illustration of the work undertaken by this Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force see 
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force First year report Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force: Washington DC, 2010). 
89
 For more information on the success stories of the Corporate Fraud Task Force see Department of Justice 
‘The President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force’, n/d, available from http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/, 
accessed January 21 2015. 
90
 Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (9 July 2002). 
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Scrushy, the corporate fraud task force, and the nature of parallel proceedings’ (2006) Georgia State University 
Law Review, Winter, 23, 427–453, at 430. 
92
 See Johnson, C. ‘U.S. promotes its record on corporate crime’, 18 July, 2007, available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071701767.html, accessed 31 July 
2013. Also see Department of Justice First year report to the President – the Corporate Fraud Task Force 
(Department of Justice: Washington DC, 2003) at 2.2; Department of Justice Second year report to the 
President – the Corporate Fraud Task Force (Department of Justice: Washington DC, 2004) at 3.2; and 
Department of Justice The Corporate Fraud Task Force report (Department of Justice: Washington DC, 2008) 
at 1.3–1.20. 
93
 See Green, M. ‘After the fall: the criminal law enforcement response to the S&L crisis’ (1991) Fordham Law 
Review, May, 59, 155–192. 
12 | P a g e  
 
the Savings and Loans Crisis and the 2008 financial crisis.  In relation to the Savings and 
Loans Crisis it was claimed that the “the DoJ is now giving special attention to the 
investigation and prosecution of banking crimes, particularly crimes connected with failed 
savings and loans institutions”.94  Therefore, it can be argued that the performance of the DoJ 
towards white collar crime emanating from the 2008 financial crisis can be contrasted with its 
approach in the Savings and Loans Crisis.  Nonetheless, there is evidence that suggests the 
SEC has outperformed its DoJ counterparts and has prioritised the use of financial penalties.  
For example, since the start of the 2008 financial crisis, the SEC has charged 161 companies 
and individuals, including 66 senior corporate officials with related offences, 37 individuals 
have either been barred from acting as company directors or suspended from doing so, the 
SEC has imposed penalty orders of $1.53bn, enforced disgorgement orders totalling $800m, 
obtained $400m compensation for affected investors and the total amount of penalties 
amounts to $2.73bn.
95
  Abramowitz and Sack took the view that: 
 
“Enforcement statistics from the SEC reveal a constant steady uptick in enforcement 
actions. Fiscal years 2011 and 2012 brought the highest numbers ever for the agency, 
with 735 and 734 total actions in those respective years. In the SEC’s 2012 annual 
report, Chairwoman Mary Schapiro noted that in connection with the financial crisis, 
the SEC has filed actions against 117 entities and individuals (in 80 actions) including 
more than 50 CEOs, CFOs and other senior corporate officers, and obtained over $2.2 
billion in monetary relief”.96 
 
Specific instances of enforcement action pursued by the SEC include Goldman Sachs 
agreeing to pay $550m to reconcile SEC charges related to subprime mortgage collateralised 
debt obligation 
97
  and CR Intrinsic agreeing to pay $600m to settle insider trading charges.
98
  
In addition to the record fines imposed by the SEC, the Commodities Futures Trading 
                                                          
94
 Ibid., at 155. 
95
 Securities and Exchange Commission above, n 7.  
96
 Abramowitz, E. and Sack, J. ‘Why so few prosecutions connected to the financial crisis?’, (2013) New York 
Law Journal, 250(46), 1-3, at 2. 
97
 Securities and Exchange Commission ‘Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges 
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO’, 15 July 2010, available from http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
123.htm, accessed 6 March 2013.   
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Settlement for Insider Trading Case’, 15 March 2013, available from 
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Commission 
99
 has been heavily involved in the manipulation of LIBOR and and has fined 
Barclays $200m,
100
  UBS $700m,
101
 RBS $325m,
102
 ICAP $65m 
103
 and  Lloyds Banking 
Group $105m.
104
  Abramowitz and Sack took the view that: 
 
“A similar upward trend has been documented at the CFTC. Fiscal year 2011 brought 
record highs with 99 enforcement actions, the highest tally in the agency’s history and a 
74 percent increase over the prior year, and more than 450 new investigations opened. 
In fiscal year 2012, the agency filed 102 enforcement actions and opened 350 new 
investigations”.105 
 
Additionally, the DoJ announced that RBS Securities Japan Limited, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of RBS, pleaded guilty to wire fraud and its role in influencing the Japanese Yen 
London Interbank Offered Rate.
106
  As part of a deferred prosecution agreement they have 
agreed to pay a $50m fine.  Additionally, RBS Securities Japan Limited agreed to pay a 
$100m penalty 
107
 and Rabobank paid a $325m criminal penalty.
108
  The Bank of America’s 
Countrywide Financial unit was found answerable for defrauding Fannie Mae and Freddie 
                                                          
99
 Hereinafter ‘CFTC’. 
100
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Mac.
109
  Furthermore, JP Morgan reached an agreement with the DoJ relation to the 
mortgage-backed securities and agreed a settlement worth $13bn.
110
  Finally, the DoJ fined 
Bank of America $16.65bn for fraud before and during the financial crisis in 2014 
111
 and in 
February 2015 it fined S&P $1.375bn for defrauding investors in the lead up to the financial 
crisis.
112
 
 
The US approach towards white collar crime that contributed towards and emanated from the 
2008 financial crisis has failed to successfully prosecute any senior figures in Wall Street.  
The DoJ appeared to act swiftly after the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market and 
instigated numerous investigations into a number of failing institutions.  The DoJ asserted 
that it has played an important role in tackling white collar crime associated with the financial 
crisis. The Attorney General Eric Holder Jr. testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission stated: 
 
“The Department has a long history of prosecuting financial fraud – and we will 
continue to do so. Working in concert with our Federal, state, local, tribal and territorial 
partners, the Justice Department is using every tool at our disposal – including new 
resources, advanced technologies and communications capabilities, and the very best 
talent we have – to prevent, prosecute and punish these crimes. And by taking dramatic 
action, our goal is not just to hold accountable those whose conduct may have 
contributed to the last meltdown, but to deter such future conduct as well”.113   
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The DoJ claims to have ‘investigated and held accountable those responsible for financial 
fraud’ during the financial crisis.114 For example, it has ‘prosecuted some of the most 
significant financial crimes bringing to justice involving numerous individuals across the 
country who perpetrated investment, securities and other fraud schemes’.115  It has been 
claimed that the creation of the Task Force clearly illustrates that the “investigation and 
prosecution of financial and investment fraud is a primary concern [for the Obama 
administration]”.116 However, the creation of another fraud related task force has been 
questioned. For example, Ramirez suggested that: 
 
“Rather than combating the relentless waves of corporate criminality with a collection 
of ad hoc task forces that seek to coordinate policy among a vast array of offices and 
agencies, the DOJ should create a Corporate Crimes Division as a permanent base in 
the department from which to pursue national policy and to more efficiently investigate 
and prosecute such crime”.117 
 
 
However, it is important to note that the DoJ has failed to obtain any high profile convictions 
and in response to these criticisms President Barak Obama announced that he would create a 
new Financial Crimes Unit “to crack down on large-scale fraud and protect people’s 
investments”.118  The Attorney General Eric Holder launched the new working group in 
January 2012 and stated that it would closely work with the Financial Fraud Enforcement 
Task Force.
119
 
 
United Kingdom 
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The Coalition government has adopted a very similar policy to its US counterparts and 
introduced legislation aimed at improving its level of banking regulation following the 2008 
financial crisis.  In its Coalition Agreement the new government stated that it would “reform 
the regulatory system to avoid a repeat of the financial crisis”.120 In June 2010, HM Treasury 
announced that he intended to abolish the FSA and transfer its powers back to the Bank of 
England,
121
 create a Financial Policy Committee,
122
 establish the Prudential Regulation 
Authority,
123
 establish the Consumer Protection Markets Authority,
124
 establish the single 
Economic Crime Agency,
125
 create the Independent Commission on Banking and introduce a 
specific bank levy.
126
 These measures were partly implemented via the Financial Services 
Act 2012 which brought a fresh approach towards banking regulation 
127
 that moved away 
from the tri-partite system that was introduced by the then Labour government to a ‘twin 
peaks’ system of regulation.128  However, despite the similarities in the approaches towards 
reforming the regulation of banks in the US and UK, there is one fundamental distinction 
between both countries: their legislative approach towards white collar crime and the 
financial crisis.  For example, as outlined above, one of the first legislative measures 
introduced by President Bark Obama was the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 2009.  
This legislation increased the allocation of funding for the DoJ and the FBI, which has 
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previously been diverted by President George Bush toward the War on Terror following the 
terrorist attacks in September 2001.  It is interesting to note that President George Bush 
refused to redirect any funding during his two terms of office toward the FBI, who had 
correctly predicted the threat posed by mortgage fraud in 2004.  Indeed, the inability of the 
FBI to tackle mortgage fraud during this period was even recognised by the Financial Crisis 
Enquiry Commission in its 2011 report.
129
  This decision must be questioned and its adverse 
effects are lavishly clear as the true extent of the involvement between mortgage fraud and 
financial crisis becomes clearer.  Furthermore, the results achieved by the ‘War on Terror’ 
and the ‘Financial War on Terror’ are derisory at best.130   
 
The Coalition government and law enforcement agencies have heavily relied on the common 
law offence of ‘conspiracy to defraud’ 131 and created new criminal offences to tackle 
misconduct in the financial sector under the parameters of the Financial Services Act 2012 
and Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.  For example, Financial Services Act 
2012 abolished the ‘misleading statement and practices’ offence created by the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000.
132
  The misleading statement and practices offence was 
enforced by the FSA, who only secured one successful prosecution,
133
 that of Carl and Gareth 
Bailey in 2005, who were convicted of “recklessly making a statement to the market which 
was misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular”.134  The FSA only secured one 
criminal conviction under this provision of FSMA because they were “not keen” to initiate 
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criminal proceedings.
135
  There has been some confusion over the ability of the FSA to 
commence criminal proceedings for certain types of white collar crime.  For example, it 
wasn’t until to decision of the Supreme Court in R v Rollins that the ability of the FSA to 
prosecute money laundering offences under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime was clarified.
136
  
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the FSA is ‘unsure’ of its ability to prosecute 
instances of fraud.  For instance, the FSA stated that “we cannot prosecute most types of 
fraud and dishonesty in contrast with money laundering; we have no direct powers to 
prosecute fraud or dishonesty offences. Prosecution is the responsibility of other law 
enforcement agencies”.137  However, the FSA does have the regulatory remit to prosecute 
certain fraudulent activity based on the following cases. For example, in March 2000 the FSA 
successfully prosecuted Paul Haslam for breaches of the Banking Act 1987.
138
 Furthermore, 
in February 2008 the FSA successfully prosecuted William Anthony ‘Robin’ Radclyffe, who 
was convicted after pleading guilty to a series of offences under the Theft Acts, the Financial 
Services Act 1986 and FSMA 2000.
139
  The ‘misleading statement and practices’ offence has 
been replaced by the Financial Services Act 2012 (Misleading Statements and Impressions) 
Order,
140
 which stipulates relevant activities, investments and benchmarks for the purposes of 
Part 7 of the Financial Services Act 2012.
141
  Additionally, the 2012 Act creates the new 
offence of creating misleading impressions, where a person will be guilty if they “does any 
act or engages in any course of conduct which creates a false or misleading impression as to 
the market in or the price or value of any relevant investments commits an offence if they 
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intends to create the impression, and (b) the case falls within subsection (2) or (3) (or 
both)”.142  More recently, the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 resulted in the 
introduction of criminal sanctions for reckless misconduct by senior managers in the 
management of a bank.
143
  However, the new criminal offence only applies to people covered 
by the Senior Managers Regime.
144
  HM Treasury took the view that Act “introduce[s] a new 
criminal offence for reckless misconduct in the management of a bank. The new offence will 
strengthen individual accountability for senior bankers, and act as a deterrent against 
misconduct”.145  The foundations of the reckless misconduct offence were located in a 
consultation document ‘Sanctions for the directors of failed banks’ that was published by HM 
Treasury in July 2012.
146
  The introduction of a new criminal offence of reckless misconduct 
makes a welcome addition to the armoury of those agencies that have been given the 
unenviable task of prosecuting white collar criminals.  The reckless misconduct offence 
carries a maximum custodial sentence of seven years.
147
  However, its general effectiveness 
must be questioned because the new criminal offence can only be used for reckless 
misconduct that leads to a bank failure.
148
  This poses a significant question, what is the 
likelihood of a UK bank failing due to the misconduct of one of its senior officers, when 
several banks are still partly owned by the tax payer?  
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However, it is important to note that there has been an increase enforcement activity of 
regulatory agencies in the UK since the start of the financial crisis.  For example, the FSA, as 
subsequently followed by the FCA, have adopted what it refers to as a ‘credible deterrence’ 
approach towards its then financial crime statutory objective.
149
  In 2007, the FSA imposed a 
total of £5.3m financial penalties on firms and individuals.
150
  A year later, the FSA reported 
that the figure had increased to £22.7m.
151
  In 2009 the total amount of financial penalties 
imposed by the FSA had risen to £35m.
152
  The figures for 2010 and 2011 illustrated an 
increase to £89.1m 
153
 and £66.1m.
154
  By 2012, the total amount of financial penalties 
imposed by the FSA, totalled £311.5m.
155
  This amount of fines paid in 2013 increased to 
£474.2m.
156
  However, these figures were dwarfed in 2014, when the FCA announced it had 
collected fines totaling £1.47bn.
157
  This amount of fines imposed in the UK by the FSA and 
FCA since 2011 have been heavily influenced by the imposition of a series of record fines 
due to the LIBOR, FOREX and gold rigging scandals.  For example, a £59.5m fine on 
Barclays,
158
 £160m fine on UBS,
159
 £87.5m fine on RBS,
160
 ICAP £14m,
161
 Rabobank 
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£105m,
162
 Barclays £26m,
163
 Lloyds Banking Group £105m,
164
 UBS £223.8m,
165
 RBS 
£217m,
166
 JP Morgan £222m,
167
 HSBC £216m 
168
 and Citibank £225m.
169
  It is important to 
note that the FCA has continued to use the ‘credible deterrence’ strategy by virtue of the 
Financial Services Act 2012.  It has been suggested by one commentator that the:  
 
“FCA intends to pursue the policy of credible deterrence as vigorously as (if not more 
so than) the FSA has done. This will mean even higher penalties against high-profile 
targets, both firms and individuals. There has been a continuing trend of imposing 
significant, exemplary sanctions against senior individuals in the market, particularly in 
the context of market conduct cases”.170 
 
Additionally, there has been an increase in the enforcement activities of the SFO, which was 
created as a result of the influential recommendations of the Roskill Report and the 
implementation of the Criminal Justice Act 1987.
171
  The SFO is an independent government 
department that investigates and prosecutes serious, complex fraud and corruption.
172
  The 
SFO was heralded at the UK’s answer to the FBI, due to its combined investigative and 
prosecutorial powers.  However, the SFO has led a troubled life and is perceived by many 
commentators as a failing organisation.  Its reputation has been tarnished by a several high-
profile failures including for example Guinness,
173
 Blue Arrow,
174
 Maxwell,
175
 Levitt 
176
 and 
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Azil Nadir.
177
  More recently, the SFO has been in the headlines for its handling of the 
bribery allegations against BAE Systems and its abandonment of the investigation into arms 
sales in Saudi Arabia.
178
  The weaknesses of the SFO have been highlighted by several 
reports including the de Grazia Review,
179
 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate in 
2008 
180
 and 2012.
181
  More recently, the SFO has been severely criticized over its poor 
handling of the Tchenguiz brother’s investigation.182  However, it is important to note that the 
SFO has increased the frequency of its investigations and prosecutions against its tainted 
track record.  For example, in 2007 the SFO reported that since 2001 it achieved a conviction 
rate of 61%.
183
  However, this figure increased to 71% in 2006/2007.
184
  In its next Annual 
Report, the conviction rate had increased to 68%.
185
  In 2009, the SFO achieved an 
impressive conviction rate of 91%;
186
 however, the figure fell to 84% in 2010, 73% in 2011 
187
 and 70% in 2012.
188
  The SFO responded to the drop in conviction rate and achieved an 
85% conviction success rate in 2013.
189
  It is essential to point out that the enforcement 
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performance of the SFO has also been hindered by decision to extend their remit to include 
the Bribery Act 2010.
190
  Under the Act the SFO or “chief prosecutors of offences under the 
Bribery Act”,191 have been provided with additional prosecutorial powers by creating several 
new offences.
192
  This includes for example offering, promising or providing a bribe,
193
 
requesting, agreeing to receive, or accepting a bribe,
194
 bribery of foreign public officials 
195
 
and failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery.
196
   As will be argued in the next 
section of this paper, the ability of the SFO to effectively enforce the Bribery Act 2010 must 
be questioned due to the extensive reduction in its operating budget since the 2010 General 
Election. 
 
One of the major criticisms of the response to white collar crime emanating from the 
financial crisis has been the lack of criminal prosecutions.  During the height of the financial 
crisis, David Cameron as leader of the opposition, boldly proclaimed that the City of London 
faced a ‘Day of Reckoning’ and that severe penalties would be imposed for those bankers 
whose reckless activities caused the financial crisis.
197
  During his ‘Day of Reckoning’ 
speech, David Cameron stated that the “important step we must take in enforcing 
responsibility in the City is to make sure that when rules are broken, and culprits are found, 
they are properly punished … the problem … is that there just doesn’t seem to be the will to 
see appropriate justice done at the highest level”.198  A number of interesting points can be 
raised from this section of the speech.  For example, David Cameron stated that when “rules 
are broken, and culprits are found, they are properly punished”.199  This raises a very 
important question, how many of those who are responsible for the financial crisis or 
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contributed to it have been held criminally liable since the Coalition government was formed 
in 2010?  The answer at the time of writing is one, following the admission of conspiracy to 
defraud originating from the manipulation of LIBOR.
200
  Furthermore, not one director of a 
bank has been disqualified by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
201
 under the 
Company Director Disqualification Act 1986.
202
  One of the most notorious failures by the 
FSA and DBIS relates to the actions of Fred Goodwin, who according to the DBIS have 
“prosecutable evidence” to pursue disqualification proceedings under the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986.
203
  Despite the continued political rhetoric from politicians and the 
DBIS, the stark reality remains, that not one company director has been disqualified for 
conduct relating to the financial crisis.  David Cameron also claimed that “corporate America 
really understood the consequences of dodgy accounting not just when Enron collapsed - but 
when Jeffrey Skilling was given a twenty-four year jail sentence”.204  This part of the speech 
must be questioned as there has been no high profile prosecutions let along convictions for 
those who contributed towards the financial crisis in the US.  US law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies have concentrated on imposing what were initially perceived as 
impressive financial penalties on the culprits and also pursuing deferred or non-prosecution 
agreements.  Sadly, authorities in the UK have adopted a similar, rather limp approach.  
David Cameron added that the “SFO should be following up every lead, investigating every 
suspect transaction … the government should be urging them on, because we need to make it 
one hundred percent clear: those who break the law should face prosecution”.205  In order for 
the SFO to ‘follow up’ every lead it is essential that it is granted the appropriate levels of 
funding.  However, since the in 2010 General Election, the SFO, like many other government 
departments and agencies, has had its budget cut as part of a glut of extensive austerity 
measures.  For example, the annual budget of the SFO in was £43.3m, in 2008/2009 it was 
£53.2m, in 2009/2010 the figure reduced to £40.1m, in 2010/2011 it was £35.5m, in 
2011/2012 the annual budget of the SFO was £31.5m and this will reduce to £34,800 in 
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2012/2013, £32.1m in 2013/2014 and £30.8m in 2014/2015.
206
  The decision to reduce the 
budget of the SFO, at a time where white collar crime has increased and the duties of the SFO 
have been expanded to incorporate the enforcement of the Bribery Act 2010, has been 
questioned and criticised.
207
  The imposition of budgetary cuts on the SFO since 2010 
initially adversely affected its investigation into the alleged manipulation of LIBOR.
208
  The 
Wall Street Journal reported that the SFO were unable to accept the offer to investigate 
LIBOR in 2011, due to significant budget cuts.
209
 However, it has also been argued that the 
former Director of the SFO, Richard Alderman, refused to investigate LIBOR and handed 
over to the FSA.
210
  It is important to note that the Coalition government responded by 
increasing the SFO budget into the investigation of LIBOR.
211
   
 
The UK stance towards white collar crime emanating from the financial crisis has been 
adversely affected because there has not been a coordinated policy from the Coalition 
government.  What we have witnessed from the government amounts to nothing more than 
customary political rhetoric as illustrated by the Prime Minister’s ‘Day of Reckoning Speech’ 
and the ‘We take white collar crime seriously’ speech by George Osborne.  In fact, it can be 
concluded that the Coalition government has not added to the foundations of a white collar 
crime strategy that were laid down by the Labour government following the publication of its 
                                                          
206
 Serious Fraud Office above, n 187 at 7. Also see for example Purkiss, A. ‘U.K. Fraud Office Hit by Budget 
Cuts, Staff Losses’, March 28 2011, available from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-28/u-k-fraud-
office-hit-by-budget-cuts-staff-losses-ft-reports.html, accessed June 30 2013. 
207
 See for example Masters, B. ‘Fraud watchdog weakened by budget cuts’, March 27 2011, available from 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8221aba2-58b5-11e0-9b8a-00144feab49a.html#axzz2XgX4w3hV, accessed June 30 
2013, Russel, J. ‘The case to answer for the Serious Fraud Office’, May 26 2012, available from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/9292046/The-case-to-answer-for-the-Serious-Fraud-
Office.html, accessed June 30 2013, Armitage, J. ‘Cuts hamper fight against crime, warns SFO director’, April 5 
2012, available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/cuts-hamper-fight-against-crime-
warns-sfo-director-7619339.html, accessed June 30 2013. 
208
 See for example Brady, B. and Owen, J. ‘Budget cuts killed of LIBOR inquiry’, 1 July 2012, available from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/budget-cuts-killed-off-libor-inquiry-7901940.html, accessed 18 
March 2013, Russell, J. ‘SFO given just £2m to enforce Bribery Act’, 30 January 2011, available from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8290808/SFO-given-just-2m-to-enforce-
Bribery-Act.html, accessed 18 March 2013, Reyes, E. ‘News focus: who will bring a Libor claim?’, July 5 2012, 
available from http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/news-focus-who-will-bring-a-libor-claim, accessed June 30 
2013. 
209
 Colchester, M. ‘U.K. Fraud Office Opens Libor Investigation’, July 6 2012, available from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303962304577510534226515306.html, accessed June 30 
2013. 
210
 Adamson, R. ‘SFO’s priorities’ (2013) Tolley’s Practical Audit and Accounting, 24(7), 81-82, at 81. 
211
 See for example Anon. ‘SFO to launch criminal investigation into Libor scandal’, July 6 2012, available 
from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9381683/SFO-to-launch-criminal-
investigation-into-Libor-scandal.html, accessed June 30 2013 and Binham, C. and Parker, G. ‘SFO secures cash 
for Libor investigation’, July 6 2012, available from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3b590260-c6cd-11e1-943a-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XgX4w3hV, accessed June 30 2013. 
26 | P a g e  
 
money laundering strategy in 2004,
212
 the Fraud Review in 2006,
213
 its 2007 counter-terrorist 
financing strategy 
214
 and bribery strategy.
215
  The Coalition government boldly asserted that 
it would tackle white collar crime and briefly considered the idea of creating a single 
Economic Crime Agency to tackle white collar crime.
216
    Sadly, the excellent vision of ECA 
was never achieved, largely due to continued political infighting and the desire of the 
government to reduce the budgetary deficit.
217
 
 
This clearly illustrates that the ‘day of reckoning’ speech amounts to another example of 
empty political promises.  It is to the bemusement of the author that the Coalition government 
has steadfastly refused to provide any additional funding to such agencies as the SFO.  In 
fact, the government has reduced the funding of the SFO by 25% since coming into office.  
This has resulted in the SFO going ‘cap in hand’ to HM Treasury to provide additional 
funding so that it could complete its investigation in to the manipulation of LIBOR.  This is 
hardly the ideal picture that needs to be presented of the SFO.  The Coalition government 
decided to create the National Crime Agency,
218
 a multifaceted organisation that would seek 
to tackle white collar crime as part of its wider agenda when compared to the previously 
narrow focused ECA.
219
  However, as opposed to merging the then existing white collar 
crime agencies into the NCA, we are left with an elaborate regulatory and law enforcement 
spiders web that has given different agencies overlapping roles leading to confusion and 
delay.   
 
Conclusion 
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What become clear after reviewing the responses to white collar crime that is associated with 
the 2008 financial crisis is that both President Barak Obama and Prime Minster David 
Cameron have pledged to bring the perpetrators to justice.  However, these bold statements 
have amounted to little more than sporadic attempts to prosecute those who allegedly 
contributed toward the financial crisis.  For example, despite the advances made by the FBI 
towards tackling mortgage fraud, not one member of Wall Street has been convicted of a 
criminal offence in relation to the financial crisis.  This can be contrasted with the tougher 
and more comprehensive response of law enforcement agencies after the Savings and Loans 
Crisis in the 1980s and the response to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom.  It is the 
conclusion of this article that US law enforcement and regulatory agencies have deliberately 
steered away from pursuing criminal proceedings and have sought to impose inadequate 
media friendly financial penalties, which represent a very small percentage of a firm’s annual 
profits.  The SEC and the DoJ are both culpable of adopting ill-considered approaches 
towards the enforcement of white collar crime legislation.  For example, this was clearly 
illustrated by the meagre fines imposed by US authorities against several banks who 
manipulated LIBOR.  None of the parties to the deferred prosecution agreements have been 
found criminally responsible for one of the largest frauds that have arisen during the financial 
crisis.  This is also evident by the imposition of a several ‘record’ financial penalties imposed 
by the SEC.  Sadly, the position is comparable with the enforcement activities in the UK by 
the FSA and FCA, who has also imposed a set of headline grabbing financial penalties on 
banks who manipulated LIBOR and FORX.  The position has not been assisted by an 
inadequate legislative and regulatory framework that resulted in LIBOR not amounting to a 
regulated activity, thus exempting it from regulation.  We were left in a very unsatisfactory 
position where LIBOR was managed and administered by British Bankers Association, thus 
representing the continuation of a ‘relic’ or the ‘dark side’ of banking regulation, namely self-
regulation.  The response of both governments in the US and UK was to initially introduce 
new legislative measures to improve their banking regulation and a series of economic 
stimulus measures aimed at maintaining the financial stability of both countries.  However, 
there is one stark difference between the approaches in the US and UK, the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act 2009.  This legislative measure was a direct response to 
white collar crime that is not only associated with the 2008 financial crisis, but also caused 
the financial crisis.  This legislation redressed the imbalance caused by the policy and 
legislative directions pursued by President George Bush following the terrorist attacks in 
September 2001.  The Coalition government has adopted a very different legislative approach 
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by creating several reactionary criminal offences aimed at those involved in market 
manipulation.  The enforcement response in both countries has been unsatisfactory, a point 
illustrated by the paucity of the financial penalties imposed by law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies.  It is extremely likely that the future efforts of law enforcement agencies 
and regulators in the UK and US will continue to utilise financial penalties and there will be a 
small number of criminal prosecutions for low level traders. 
